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Arguably one of the most astonishing abilities of human beings is our capacity to
refer to and to occupy ourselves with things, people, events and states of affairs that
are not at all actually present here and now. We do so in our private thoughts, in
imagining, remembering, planning, or publicly by means of images, plays,
languages and other sign systems. In all such activities we normally understand
without especially having to reflect that we do not simply perceive something
present with our senses, but that in one way or another we have something as it were
in view or in mind that is not itself present. At the same time, while knowing that we
are occupied with something that we do not take to be really present, it nonetheless
feels like we are standing in the actuality here and now. Even what we merely
present in thought as not at all itself being really present here and now, or what we
likewise experience as being represented in an image, as played, described, or
otherwise signified, is given to us only in contrast to that which counts as being
really present. If we were to lose this consciousness of contrast, we would be
dreaming, or be subject to an illusion or hallucination, and in the process we would
take the things, people, events and states of affairs to which we would be turned to
be really given—instead of taking them to be merely imagined, remembered, or to
be presented as merely possible, as represented in an image, in a symbolic play, or
verbally, and so on.
In short, we human beings do not only live in the present, perceiving it with our
senses, we are also able, in manifold ways, to transcend the always present sensory
actuality and to be active in one or another form of re-presentation (Vergegenwa¨rti-
gung). In his lectures of 1904/1905, the third main piece of which on ‘‘Phantasy and
Image Consciousness’’ makes up Text No. 1 of Phantasy, Image Consciousness,
and Memory, Husserl says:
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Everyone knows what it means to re-present an object to oneself, to bring it
forward in an internal image, to make it hover before one. Everyone uses the
expression ‘‘to imagine’’ [einbilden], and thus knows to some extent what
is essential to the case. But only implicitly, I am sorry to say (Hua XXIII,
p. 17/18).
The point of the texts in the volume of Edmund Husserl’s Collected Works1 here
reviewed is primarily to clarify, by way of reflective analyses of consciousness,
diverse phenomena of re-presenting (Vergegenwa¨rtigen) as against perceiving.2 In a
wide usage of the term, Husserl often understands phantasy (memory included)
quite generally as ‘‘consciousness characterized as re-presentation (Vergegenwa¨rti-
gung)’’ (Hua X, p. 45/47); he also says:
Consciousness of what is not present [Nichtgegenwa¨rtigkeits-Bewusstsein]
belongs to the essence of phantasy. We live in a present; we have a perceptual
field of regard. In addition, however, we have appearances that present
something not present lying entirely outside this field of regard (Hua XXIII,
p. 58f./63).
The texts in Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory pertain to a topic that had
been central for Husserl from early on, namely to elaborate for given species of
experiences the typically phenomenological definition of essentially different modes
of consciousness, that is, of the intentional relation to something objective. More
precisely, in the texts of this volume it is a matter of determining within the class of
presentations (Vorstellungen)—in contrast to the classes of judgments and
emotions—the specifically different characters of the intention of the intuitive
(anschauliche) presentations in contrast to conceptual (begriffliche) presentations.
One of the chief tasks for the analysis of the domain of intuitive mental acts consists
in setting off the diverse forms of intuitive re-presentations (anschauliche
Vergegenwa¨rtigungen)—perhaps better ‘‘representifications’’—from the basic form
of intuitive consciousness, namely, perception or presentification (Gegenwa¨rti-
gung), by bringing into relief the intentional characteristics of these various forms.
It is generally characteristic of intuitive presentations that in them an object
appears (erscheint), and this is either the presented object itself (selbst) or an image
(Bild) of the latter. This stands in contrast to the consciousness of signification
(Bedeutungsbewusstsein), in which an object or a state of affairs is meant or
signified (gemeint), without having to appear. It can only be mentioned here that for
Husserl all these investigations into the forms of intuitive and conceptual or
significational presentations stand in a foundational connection. It was Husserl’s
view from early on that the higher-level conceptual and categorial acts of meaning,
signification and judgment, in which cognition comes to pregnant expression, are
founded in the sensuous, intuitive acts of perception and their modifications. The
1 Originally published from the handwritten, mostly shorthand Nachlass in German as Hua XXIII.
Throughout this review, references to this volume and its translation will be given as Hua XXIII followed
first by the German pagination and then the English pagination, separated by a slash.
2 Parts of the text of this review are taken over and translated into English from my ,,Einleitung des
Herausgebers‘‘ in Hua XXIII and from my ,,Einleitung‘‘ to Husserl (2006).
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analysis of these intuitive acts and their intellective structuring is crucially involved
in Husserl’s studies on the theory of meaning and judgment.3
In his philosophical phenomenology, as is well known, Husserl argued that prior
to all causal-explanatory, psychological, and (increasingly nowadays) cognitive and
affective neuroscientific investigations of our experiential life and actions, the
phenomena themselves as they occur in our conscious life are to be subjected to a
differential analysis. This is the task of ‘‘a description not at all appreciated for its
true importance and difficulty’’ (Hua XXIII, p. 13/12). Time and again Husserl
stressed the difficulties and peculiarities of the reflective descriptive analysis
required for doing phenomenology. Descriptively he attempted step-by-step to
define the conceptual nature of conscious experiences of distinct kinds on the basis
of those inner characteristics that give rise to essential generalizations and thus to
concept formations. In Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, for example,
when he starts examining the—at first glance plausible—‘‘notion that phantasy
presentation can be interpreted as image presentation’’ in his lectures of 1904/1905
(Hua XXIII, Nr. 1, §8, note 1, p. 16/note 2, p. 18), he points out:
To begin with, we compare as far as possible the two sorts of imaginings and
seek to make clear to ourselves the common element in image presentation.
We want to begin gradually and with the greatest possible caution. For as easy
as the analysis at first appears, the difficulties that subsequently come to light
and gradually require many modifications in what we earlier accepted and
many new distinctions in what we earlier took to be simple are just as great
(Hua XXIII, p. 17f./19).
And Husserl immediately adds the following general remark:
Indeed, this is universally the peculiarity of phenomenological analysis. Every
step forward yields new points of view from which what we have already
discovered appears in a new light, so that often enough what we were
originally able to take as simple and undivided presents itself as complex and
full of distinctions (Hua XXIII, p. 18/19).
It is a philosophically most intriguing and absorbing experience (though no doubt at
times a quite frustrating one), when dealing with the shorthand manuscripts from
Husserl’s Nachlass, that we as readers are able to attend to creative thinking and
writing processes in unadorned form, to clarifications gradually reached, but also to
their failures and aporias. In a letter of October 1904 to his teacher Franz Brentano,
Husserl wrote:
I am certain in advance that a large part of what I have written is erroneous;
but equally certain that there were errors that had once to be tried out, once to
be ventured. We will not find definite truth in the foundations without having
seriously thought through all possibilities. But only he thinks through a
possibility wholly seriously who believes in it (quoted in Hua XXIII, p. lii).
3 See, e.g., Hua XL, especially Sect. B. Urteil und Vorstellung, p. 249ff. and Sect. D. Urteil und
Anschauung bzw. Wahrnehmung, p. 353ff. Also Husserl (1954).
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Such a putting to the test of possibilities is typical of Husserl’s ‘‘analytic
phenomenology’’ (Hua XIX/1, p. 17) and it is also very much at work in Phantasy,
Image Consciousness, and Memory. Both understanding and evaluating the
argumentation in these texts require a high degree of reconstructive thinking. In
the course of this enactment it is not only a matter of checking the logical
consequences among the statements. In order to assess their veracity it is also
necessary that one perform for oneself reflective observation of the objects of
phenomenological analyses, that is, of the phenomena of consciousness with which
the statements are concerned and which are exemplified by means of suitable
instances.
John B. Brough’s admirable translation into English of all of Husserl’s texts and
appendices of the German edition of Husserliana XXIII is a most generous gift to
the philosophical community worldwide. The translation is also valuable to readers
able to understand the German originals. Judging from this reviewer’s case, it can
indeed be an illuminating experience for a native German speaker somewhat
familiar with Husserl’s often highly convoluted texts to reacquaint himself or
herself with Husserl’s exploratory thinking when it is made available in such a well-
considered translation. Brough had already produced a highly acclaimed translation
into English of Husserl’s demanding texts On the Phenomenology of the
Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917), first published 1990 as volume IV
in Edmund Husserl. Collected Works, and accompanied it with a very informative
and philosophically challenging introduction. His Husserl expertise, already evident
there, is borne out again in Brough’s new translation and in his impressive
‘‘Translator’s Introduction’’ to Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, in
which he discusses a number of issues also addressed below. Far beyond the narrow
circle of Husserl scholars, students of the philosophically closely related topics
treated in Husserl’s texts should count themselves lucky to have them made
available in such excellent translation. I cannot help but wonder what, for example,
Colin McGinn’s fine study, Mindsight. Image, Dream, Meaning (2004), might have
become if the author had already known of Brough’s translation, published one year
later. Perhaps it would have prompted McGinn to draw on Husserl’s analyses and
include him among the ‘‘philosophers as diverse as Sartre, Wittgenstein, and
Collingwood’’ who, ‘‘in the twentieth century […] paid extensive attention to
imagination’’ (McGinn 2004, p. 1)!
In the ‘‘Einleitung des Herausgebers’’ to Hua XXIII I provided an account of the
history of Husserl’s texts in the volume, of the historical origin of the
phenomenology of intuitions (Anschauungen), and in particular of the development
of problems in Husserl’s phenomenology of intuitive re-presentations (representif-
ications) (Hua XXIII, pp. xxv–lxxxi). Within the limits of the present review, let me
seize the opportunity of singling out two problem areas which, even after more than
thirty years, strike me as being among Husserl’s philosophically most interesting
contributions to consciousness studies, the analytical subtlety of which can be
gathered from this collection of texts.
With an eye on Husserl’s development after his lectures on phantasy and image
consciousness of 1904/1905, it is indeed very intriguing to see that some of the main
results with which Husserl seemed to be happy at the end of the lectures were quite
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radically put into question by himself shortly afterwards and were gradually and
substantially refined in later texts included in Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and
Memory. The analytical distinction between two forms of presentation—phantasy
and image consciousness—provides, I think, a lasting gain of insight into the
phenomenological situation, undercutting the initially assumed parallelism of
phantasy and image consciousness which took them both to be an image
presentation (Bildlichkeitsvorstellung). This is not the case, however, either (1)
with regard to the determination of the phantasy presentation in itself and as such, or
(2) with regard to the determination of the image presentation in itself and as such.
Regarding (1), the phenomenology of phantasy: Towards the end of his analysis
in 1904/1905, after decisively arguing in favor of ‘‘the essential distinction between
imagination (Imagination) in the proper sense (perceptual imagination), and
imagination understood as phantasy (Phantasie)’’ (Hua XXIII, Chap. 8, p. 82ff/
89ff.), Husserl concludes: ‘‘The phantasy appearance, the simple phantasy
appearance unencumbered by any imaging built on it, relates to its object just as
straightforwardly [einfa¨ltig] as perception does’’ (Hua XXIII, p. 85/92). And
especially first with regard to ‘‘clear, perfectly adequate phantasies’’ or memories—
that is, ‘‘without troubling ourselves about obscure phantasies’’—he added:
Now it is true of clear phantasies that a pure re-presentational consciousness
[reines Vergegenwa¨rtigungsbewusstsein] is brought about in them on the/basis
of phantasms and the apprehension objectivating the phantasms. Objectivating
the phantasms does not constitute, in advance, an image object that hovers
before one and even appears as present; on the contrary, what appears is
immediately something that is not present4 […]. In itself […] the phantasy
presentation [Phantasievorstellung] does not contain a manifold intention
[keine mehrfa¨ltige Intention], re-presentation is an ultimate mode of intuitive
objectivation [Vergegenwa¨rtigung ist ein letzter Modus intuitiver Vorstel-
lung], just like perceptual objectivation [Wahrnehmungsvorstellung], just like
presentation [Gegenwa¨rtigung] (Hua XXIII, p. 85f./92f.—emphasis partly
mine).
However, precisely this result will be reversed by Husserl just a few years later. On
the basis of a deeper analysis of the phenomena, taking into account internal time-
consciousness, he will elaborate a radically new description of the intentional
structure of phantasy as consciousness of re-presentation, with the help of the
concept of reproductive modification of experiences. The texts grouped in No. 2,
‘‘From the theory of representation [Repra¨sentation] in phantasy and memory to the
introduction of the doctrine of reproduction or double re-presentation [doppelte
Vergegenwa¨rtigung],’’ together with the texts No. 3 through No. 13 and the
corresponding appendices, all written between about 1904 up to about 1912 (Hua
XXIII, pp. 170–300/207–361), permit us to see into Husserl’s search for a more
differentiated analysis of pure re-presentational consciousness. The new analysis is
then clearly brought to bear in research manuscripts from 1911 and 1912, published
4 Translation slightly amended from ‘‘what immediately appears is something that is not present’’ (p. 93);
the German text reads: ‘‘das Erscheinende ist unmittelbar das Nichtgegenwa¨rtige’’ (p. 86).
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in the volume as Nos. 14, 15 and 16 and corresponding appendices (Hua XXIII,
pp. 301–485/363–579).
To illustrate this achievement of clarification in Husserl’s analyses of the
consciousness of re-presentation, consider for example the following passages:
‘‘Hence we must say: Every experience admits of a fundamental modification. It is
called the reproductive modification, and in relation to it the unmodified experience
itself is called impressional experience’’ (Hua XXIII, p. 330/402), explicated in a
note thus:
Internal consciousness is impression in relation to every experience: every
experience is impressional. Every reproductive modification is the reproduc-
tion of an internally ‘‘impressionally conscious’’ experience; the reproduction
itself is impressionally conscious (Hua XXIII, p. 330, note 3/p. 402, note 4).5
This new description is based on analyses of internal time-consciousness, which
Husserl began to study seriously in the last part of the lectures of 1904/1905. At the
outset of this part, after referring to ‘‘the most peculiar difficulties, contradictions,
and confusions’’ in which one gets entangled as soon as one attempts to give an
account of time-consciousness, Husserl had pointed to ‘‘the most intimate
connection’’ between the intuitive acts of perception, imagination, memory, and
image consciousness, which had been dealt with in the previous parts of the lectures,
explaining in this deleted passage that
it is obvious that an analysis of the consciousness of perception, the
consciousness of phantasy, memory, expectation is not accomplished as long
as temporality [Zeitlichkeit] is not also included in the analysis, and that
conversely an analysis of time-consciousness presupposes to a large extent
that of the said acts (Hua X, editorial supplement, p. 394).
If not at once, then in the course of only a few years, when he turned to the
‘‘clarification of diverse basic kinds of the modification as well as of all kinds of
‘re-presentation’,’’ Husserl elaborated an ever more refined insight into the ‘‘most
remarkable intentionality of the ‘modifications’.’’6 The main result clearly
contradicts the finding from 1904/1905 where Husserl had stated that ‘‘in itself’’
(an sich selbst), phantasy does not contain ‘‘a manifold intention’’ (keine
mehrfa¨ltige Intention). A few years later, in contrast, Husserl was able to pinpoint
the description of the re-presentational modification, which he came to see as itself
‘‘an event belonging to internal consciousness’’ (Hua X, p. 368/379) or to time-
consciousness as follows:
[…] every ‘modification’\is[characterized thus that in it itself the relation to
another consciousness is contained of which it is called modification, a
5 Translation partly amended from ‘‘is the reproduction of an experience of which there is ‘impressional
consciousness’ internally; there is impressional consciousness of the reproduction itself’’ (p. 402, note 4).
The German text reads: ‘‘ist Reproduktion eines innerlich ‘impressiv bewussten’ Erlebnisses, die
Reproduktion selbst ist impressiv bewusst’’ (p. 330, note 3).
6 Quoted in Hua XXIII, p. lxiii; see also p. lxx. Subsequently the entire manuscript from 1917/1918 was
published in Hua XXXIII, Text Nr. 9. The quote is found there on p. 176.
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consciousness, which is not really contained in it and yet is graspable for a
suitably directed reflection. […] And with it are then still connected specific
reflections on the corresponding act-correlates.7
Henceforth, what Husserl will emphasize in his analyses of the main types of
re-presentational acts is their ‘‘wondrously interwoven intentionality’’ (wundersam
ineinandergeflochtene Intentionalita¨t; see Hua VIII, p. 128; emphasis partly mine).
A remarkably two-sided version of this subtle result is already described in a text
from 1911 or 1912 with regard to the example of memory, which is included in
Husserl’s wide concept of phantasy as re-presentation. On the one side:
Memory is a reproductive modification of perception, but it has the remarkable
peculiarity that it is also re-presentation of perception and not simply
re-presentation of what was perceived. I remember lunch. ‘‘Implicit’’ in this
memory, however, is also memory of the perception of lunch (irrespective of
the direction of my act of meaning) (Hua XXIII, no. 14, p. 305f./367;
emphasis mine).
And on the other side, a little later in the same text:
The external perception is perception. And if the modification of the
perception is then a corresponding memory, we have the remarkable
circumstance that the corresponding memory is not only memory of the
perception but that the modification of the perception is also memory of what
was perceived (Hua XXIII, p. 308/370; emphasis mine).
Texts like these clearly show Husserl’s discovery of the duality (Doppelheit) in the
re-presentational consciousness itself and in its intentional relation to something
objective, respectively. This duality is involved in the essence of the reproduction as
reproduction of an impression, and it requires a double-sided reflective description,
directed (a) at the re-presented object (e.g., lunch) and (b) at the re-presented—
namely reproductively modified or intentionally implied—perception, i.e., the
experience that is ‘‘contained’’ in a re-presentational act.
Moreover, Husserl recognizes that description of the ‘‘modes of reproduction’’
must also take into account the phenomena of position takings (Stellungnahmen),
cognitive acts that are expressed in judgments as well as affective position takings,
aesthetic evaluations, etc. Such phenomena reach beyond the domain of the intuitive
re-presentations belonging to phantasy, image consciousness and memory and lead
into the domain of the theory of judgment, of ‘‘suppositions’’ (Ansa¨tze) and
modifications of merely thinking-of. All these developments and descriptive
refinements are based on the theory of the reproductive modification or the
intentional implication of consciousness and confirm the general point that what, in
phenomenological analysis, could originally be taken ‘‘as simple and undivided
presents itself as complex and full of distinctions.’’
Regarding (2), the phenomenology of image consciousness: In approaching this
topic—to which, as Brough also observes in his ‘‘Translator’s Introduction,’’ ‘‘some
7 See note 6. The quote is from Hua XXIII, p. lxx, or Hua XXXIII, p. 176; emphasis mine.
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of Husserl’s most fascinating and cogent analyses are devoted’’ (p. xliv)—it strikes
me as particularly important to emphasize that the seemingly achieved clarity in the
analysis of ordinary image consciousness in the lectures of 1904/1905 is repeatedly
put into question in later texts. In the course of the lectures, ‘‘intent on
distinguishing between phantasy presentation and ordinary image presentation,’’
Husserl confidently states: ‘‘Image presentation became perfectly clear to us’’ (Hua
XXIII, p. 54/59, emphasis mine). For he once more insists that:
One thing is indeed clear from the beginning: The ‘‘image’’ in the case of
physical imaging—that is, the image object—is a figment, a perceptual object
but also a semblance object. It appears in the way in which an actual physical
thing appears, but in conflict with the actual present that conflict-free
perception brings about. Now this figment, or rather this fiction consciousness,
is permeated with representational consciousness [Bewusstsein der Repra¨sen-
tation]. Hence imaginative consciousness arises here. And it arises in the new
conflict between the figment and what is imagined (Hua XXIII, p. 54, similarly
p. 79/59 and 85f.).
The really moot point in Husserl’s analyses of image consciousness concerns the
mode of givenness of the image object. When he, in his early investigations, says
things to the effect that ‘‘the image object appears in the midst of perceptual reality
and claims, as it were, to have objective reality in its midst’’ (Hua XXIII, p. 47f./51),
or when he describes this way of givenness as ‘‘an image object appearing as present
[…] an object that deports itself as a member of the objectivity of one’s field of
regard’’ (Hua XXIII, p. 83/90), or as ‘‘a figment, a perceptual object but also a
semblance object’’ (Hua XXIII, p. 54/59), then at least at first glance it may look as
if Husserl argued that imaging (Bildlichkeit) were at bottom constituted as
consciousness of a figment in the sense of an illusion—as if, conflicting with other
perceptual positings at the level of perception, the image figment (Bildfiktum) turned
out to be a mere semblance, ‘‘a nothing’’ (Hua XXIII, p. 46/50), though still as a
presently appearing perceptual object, analogously to a ‘‘sensuous semblance’’ (Hua
XXIII, p. 32/33).
Contrary to such a view that lets image consciousness appear to be a matter of
sensuous perception and conflicts among perceptual positings alone, there are,
however, several passages already in the lectures of 1904/1905, where Husserl
clearly argues that for image consciousness to come about, a consciousness of re-
presentation (Vergegenwa¨rtigungsbewusstsein) is fundamental, thanks to which the
relation to the image subject is constituted. Thus, for example, with regard to
ordinary image consciousness:
If the conscious relation to something depicted is not given with the image,
then we certainly do not have an image. This conscious relation, however, is
given through that specific consciousness belonging to the re-presentation of
what does not appear in what does appear […] If two objectivating
apprehensions were not interwoven with one another, it would be a miracle, or
nonsense, how a consciousness of this kind is possible, since only the image
and certainly not the subject falls into the appearance. The making intuitive in
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the image, which in the image-appearing possesses the consciousness of the
image subject, is not an arbitrary characteristic that adheres to the image.
Rather, the intuition of the image object awakens precisely a new conscious-
ness, a presentation of a new object […/…] Yet this new presentation does not
lie next to the presentation of the image object either; on the contrary, it
coincides with it, permeates it, and in this permeation gives it the
characteristic of the image object (Hua XXIII, p. 31/32f., emphasis partly
mine).
Here and elsewhere in the early lectures, Husserl emphasizes that ‘‘phantasy
consciousness,’’ i.e., consciousness of re-presentation, ‘‘makes up the most essential
moment even in common imaging’’ (Hua XXIII, p. 87/93f.). This consciousness of
re-presentation or phantasy, in contrast to ‘‘the pure and simple phantasy function’’
(p. 94, line 35—reading ‘‘phantasy function’’ instead of ‘‘phantasy object’’), ‘‘is,
however, permeated with a presentational consciousness’’ (Hua XXIII, p. 86/93),
and this permeation bestows in effect the ‘‘characteristic of unreality’’ (Un-
wirklichkeit) (Hua XXIII, p. 47/51), i.e., the ‘‘characteristic of the image object’’
(Hua XXIII, p. 31/33) upon that which perceptually appears, however not the
characteristic of an annulled and illusory semblance object.
That the consciousness of semblance or of unreality in the case of an image can
indeed not be understood as a figment consciousness in the sense of an illusion is
made even clearer in later texts from about 1912 (Hua XXIII, Nr. 17, p. 486ff./No.
17, 581ff.). Husserl now explains that the characteristic of unreality in the case of an
image rests on the circumstance that something is projected into reality from
phantasy (hineinphantasiert), something that is not at all given in the immediately,
perceptually appearing present. The image does not genuinely ‘‘‘appear’’’ in the
unity of reality, ‘‘but in its own space, which in itself has no direct relation to real
space’’ (Hua XXIII, p. 480/570). The image figment does appear ‘‘without having
the characteristic of reality, without ‘laying claim’ to reality, a claim that would first
have to be cancelled’’ (Hua XXIII, p. 480/571—reading ‘‘first’’ instead of ‘‘only’’).
As Husserl describes it in the present context, the difference between phantasy and
image consciousness
consists only in the fact that the ‘‘phantasy image’’ is a reproductive image, the
seen image a perceptual [perzeptives] image. Both are cases of imagination.
This must never be forgotten and is absolutely certain. I was entirely correct
when I sought again and again to take image apprehension as imagining
[Imagination]. It is imagining. The image turns into something null only
through a connection with reality. As soon as I take it in this connection (or
take it as having this connection; for example, take the image subject, where
the frame begins, in spatial relation to real space, and so on)—as soon as I thus
suppose it—it turns into something null (Hua XXIII, p. 480/570).
As already hinted, the truly puzzling and at the same time philosophically
particularly challenging aspect of Husserl’s analysis of image consciousness,
variably pursued over many years, concerns his wavering views of the mode of
givenness (Gegebenheitsweise) of the image object. It is an elating experience to
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think through all the nuances of the relevant texts in Brough’s excellent translation.
Not only in the early texts, but still, for example, in No. 18, probably from 1918,
Husserl presents the situation as if the image object were a perceptual givenness
which stands there ‘‘as present actuality.’’ But ‘‘this present and this actuality,’’ he
then remarks, is ‘‘just actuality as if,’’ adding ‘‘the image only hovers before us
perceptually’’ (Hua XXIII, No. 18, p. 506/607). And in No. 20, written in the first
half of the nineteen-twenties, where Husserl discusses the concept of phantasy in
relation to the universal concept of neutrality and ‘‘mere presentation,’’ with brief
references to Aristotle, Hume, and Brentano, as well as to his own Logical
Investigations (1901) and Ideas (1913), there is this passage:
‘‘Mere’’ phantasy signifies, then, that no ‘‘actual’’ [‘‘wirklicher’’] performing
of an act takes place—‘‘mere presentation’’. But matters no doubt become
more complicated in the case of the ‘‘image object’’, which, appearing as
present ‘‘in person’’ [leibhaftig], can nevertheless also be designated as
‘‘fiction’’, though one must no longer speak of a re-presentation [Verge-
genwa¨rtigung] in this case. Indeed, it is presentation [Pra¨sentation]. Here, too,
the ‘‘positing’’, the believing in something [das In-Geltung-Haben], is
‘‘missing’’ (Hua XXIII, No. 20, p. 575/693; see also No. 20, p. 580/697f.).
Then again, in No. 16, probably from spring 1912, Husserl notes with regard to
image consciousness:
Must we not say: ‘‘Exhibiting’’ [‘‘Darstellung’’] belongs to the essence of
image consciousness; image consciousness is not simply perceptual con-
sciousness and, in any event, not a perceptual consciousness that is combined
additionally with a reproductive consciousness (namely, a phantasy con-
sciousness)? That is not correct (Hua XXIII, p. 471/560).8
Starting the analysis anew, Husserl continues:
Image consciousness has implicated in it ‘‘sensation contents’’ that one can
find in it, that one can grasp in it, and doubtlessly it has this in common with
perceptual consciousness. However, if we focus our attention strictly on the
image appearances in which these trees, these human beings, and so on, appear
as image trees, image human beings, we find, as we do in the case of
reproductive phantasy, that the appearances are obviously not merely
perceiving appearances. On the contrary, they are imagining appearances:
that is to say, the sensation content in the appearance exhibits something, and
the appearance itself exhibits appearance. The apprehension is not simply
apprehension, but the exhibiting of apprehension (Hua XXIII, No. 16,
p. 471f./560f.).
Pondering upon several other possibilities of understanding the status of the image
object in image consciousness in the same text, Husserl also offers the following
8 The translator’s note is to the point when he observes that ‘‘Husserl seems to mean here that it would
not be correct to say that image consciousness is simply perceptual consciousness, etc.’’ (p. 560, note 6).
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self-criticism of his former view developed in the lectures of 1904/1905, noting that
‘‘these are important [folgenschwere] questions’’:
The distinctions I have been studying here, though perhaps I have not yet
given them a perfectly accurate interpretation, ought not to confuse us. We can
understand by image object the actually perceived […] object as opposed to
the object exhibited. If we look more closely, however, we have distinctions in
connection with images. My example of Raphael’s theological painting9: The
little grey cherubs, the small female figure—I called these little figures image
objects. What is exhibited, the subject, is the form of a sublime woman, and so
on. If we look more closely, however, the following view offers itself: The
little figures are indeed exhibited objects (Hua XXIII, p. 473/562).10
All of these considerations result in a number of conceptual clarifications in the text
from 1912:
In summary, therefore: (1) We must separate the apprehension of an image object
and the consciousness of a perceptual illusion \inserted later: ‘‘(something
null)’’[. The former is nonpositing, the latter positing. (2) In union with the
image-object apprehension we have the exhibiting (Darstellung). […] Now
exhibiting as exhibiting has certain things in common with reproduction\i.e.
with re-presentation[, […] (5) […] namely, precisely the fact that we have in
every component of the exhibiting (of the genuine exhibiting) a reference to
‘‘something corresponding’’ (Hua XXIII, p. 474f./563ff.).
In concluding his many reflections about modes of reproduction, phantasy, image
consciousness with simultaneous consideration of the phenomena of position-taking
and abstaining from it in the texts no. 15 and no. 16 and the related appendices,
Husserl emphasizes:
We must therefore universalize the concept of phantasy (let us say, the concept
of re-presentation). There are two fundamental forms of re-presentation:
(1) reproductive re-presentation;
(2) perceptual re-presentation, that is, re-presentation in image, in pictorial
exhibiting. Since reproductive modifications correspond to every experience,
the perceptual re-presentation then also enters into reproductive re-presenta-
tion, there arises pictorializing re-presentation in the phantasy re-presentation
(or in memory).11
9 See Text No. 1, §21, p. 47: ‘‘For example, if I contemplate the picture of Raphael’s theological subject
hanging above my desk […].’’ Husserl writes ‘‘Bild der Raffaelschen Theologie’’ (Hua XXIII, p. 44),
referring to Raphael’s painting ‘‘Theologia’’.
10 ‘‘Exhibited’’ in the last sentence was somewhat later changed to ‘‘merely presented’’ (bloss
vorgestellte), to be understood as re-presented (vergegenwa¨rtigt) (ibid.).
11 Translation partly amended: ‘‘enters into’’ instead of ‘‘passes into,’’ and ‘‘there arises’’ instead of
‘‘grows into.’’ Both changes seem to me better to convey Husserl’s point, namely that perceptual re-
presentation, i.e. image consciousness, can also be reproductively modified, yielding a more complex
reproductive re-presentation of a perceptual re-presentation—for example, a phantasy or a memory re-
presentation of a re-presentation in image, as in everyday cases of phantasying of seeing, or remembering
of having seen, a picture.
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One must separate these modifications from those that convert positing into
nonpositing. (Intersection of the two kinds of distinction.) Furthermore, one
must not confuse nonpositing perceptions with experiences that exhibit
something in an image: with re-presentation, therefore (Hua XXIII, p. 475f./
565).
To round off the review of John B. Brough’s translation, permit me to propose a
more unified English terminology for some of the basic German terms in Husserl’s
writings on the topics at hand. The German term ‘‘Vorstellung’’ is notoriously
ambiguous, as is no doubt ‘‘representation’’ in English. Unlike what I myself have
practised in Marbach (1993) and elsewhere—for example, in the Encyclopedia of
Phenomenology (Embree et al. 1997, p. 603ff.), under the heading ‘‘re-presenta-
tion,’’ and unlike the translator of the volume under review, I would now like to
suggest, taking a clue from Nicolas de Warren’s recent paper ‘‘Tamino’s Eyes,
Pamina’s Gaze’’ (2010), the following terminology as perhaps the least confusing:
Vorstellung, vorstellen presentation, to present
Gegenwa¨rtigung, gegenwa¨rtigen presentification, to presentify (NdW)
Vergegenwa¨rtigung, vergegenwa¨rtigen representification, to representify (NdW)
Darstellung, darstellen representation, to represent
Phantasie phantasy or imagination
As I presently see it, this would take care quite elegantly of the various semantic
nuances and one could even avoid hyphens, which disappear in any case all too
often when a word has to be separated.
To be sure, I am fully aware of the practical difficulties of making such a
proposal universally acceptable. And let us not forget that terminology is just
terminology; the most important thing is conceptual lucidity, and Brough’s
translation of Husserl’s terminologically often bewildering texts testify to his
masterly handling of them at the conceptual, properly philosophical, level.
References
De Warren, N. (2010). Tamino’s eyes, Pamina’s gaze. In C. Ierna, H. Jacobs, & F. Mattens (Eds.),
Philosophy, phenomenology, sciences, Phaenomenologica 200 (pp. 303–332). Dordrecht: Springer.
Embree, L., et al. (Eds.). (1997). Encyclopedia of phenomenology. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Hua VIII. Husserl, E. (1959). Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil: Theorie der pha¨nomenologischen
Reduktion. R. Boehm (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Hua X. Husserl, E. (1966). Zur Pha¨nomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917). R. Boehm
(Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff; On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time
(1893–1917). J. Brough (Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
Hua XIX/1. Husserl, E. (1984). Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band, Erster Teil. Untersuchungen
zur Pha¨nomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. U. Panzer (Ed.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Hua XXIII. Husserl, E. (1980). Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung. Zur Pha¨nomenologie der
anschaulichen Vergegenwa¨rtigungen. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1898–1925). E. Marbach (Ed.). The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
236 Husserl Stud (2012) 28:225–237
123
Hua XXXIII. Husserl, E. (2001). Die Bernauer Manuskripte u¨ber das Zeitbewusstsein (1917/1918).
R. Bernet and D. Lohmar (Eds.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Hua XL. Husserl, E. (2009). Untersuchungen zur Urteilstheorie. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1893–1918).
R. D. Rollinger (Ed.). Dordrecht: Springer.
Husserl, E. (1954). Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik. L. Landgrebe (Ed.).
Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag; Experience and judgment: Investigations in a genealogy of logic.
J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks (Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
Husserl, E. (2006). Phantasie und Bildbewusstsein, Studienausgabe. Text nach Husserliana Band XXIII.
E. Marbach (Ed.). Philosophische Bibliothek Band 576. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.
Marbach, E. (1993). Mental representation and consciousness. Towards a phenomenological theory of
representation and reference. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
McGinn, C. (2004). Mindsight. Image, dream, meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Husserl Stud (2012) 28:225–237 237
123
